ABSTRACT In this paper, we consider a non-regenerative relay network supporting simultaneous wireless information and power transfer, in which the energy harvesting relay is powered by radio-frequency signals from the source node. Assuming imperfect channel state information from the source/relay to the destination/eavesdropper, we investigate the artificial noise-aided secure robust beamformer that minimize the transmission power at the relay, while guaranteeing the secrecy rate constraint and the transmit power constraint at the relay. In particular, two types of energy harvesting strategies are considered termed power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS), respectively. These constraints make the optimization problems formulated non-convex and challenging, which are efficiently solved by using the S-procedure and semidefinite relaxation techniques to formulate a tractable approximated version of the original problems. Numerical results show the effectiveness of the proposed robust beamforming schemes. Furthermore, the PS strategy performs better than the TS strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer security enhanced by multi-antenna techniques, such as precoding/beamforming and interference alignment, has attracted substantial research interests in recent years [1] - [3] , in which the multi-antenna nodes are capable of adjusting the directions of their transmitted signal to improve the security performance. On the other hand, radio-frequency (RF) enabled wireless energy transfer is a promising approach to power the energy-constrained networks [4] . Since the inherent openness of the transmission medium makes the wireless information more vulnerable to eavesdropping, secure communication is identified as a critical challenge facing simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) systems [5] - [7] .
For co-located information decoding (ID) and energy harvesting (EH), two widely strategies termed power splitting (PS) and time switching (TS) were used for SWIPT (see e.g. [8] - [10] ). Physical-layer security based communication in SWIPT systems operating on multiple-input singleoutput (MISO) and multiple-input multiple-output ( MIMO) broadcast channels has been studied in [9] , [11] , and [12] . Besides, the secure SWIPT for cooperative networks was also studied in [13] and [14] . Specifically, the authors in [13] first designed the relay beamformer for secure SWIPT in a multiantennas nonregenerative relay system, in which three suboptimal algorithms were proposed to maximize the secrecy rate. In [14] , cooperative jammer as a friendly helper was introduced into a SWIPT network that sent individual jamming signal to confuse the eavesdropper. These two efforts operated in this scenario with the existence of the external energy receiver and the destination receiver.
Since relay is commonly an energy-constrained node in cooperative networks, it is critical to require ambient energy supply for supporting cooperative communication. An important application scenario for SWIPT lies in the energyconstrained relay networks, in which the relay node solely harvests energy from the RF signals transmitted by the source and then uses the harvested energy to forward the received signal to the destination receiver. Secure SWIPT in wirelesspowered relay networks has been studied in [15] - [18] .
To elaborate, [15] presented the problem of secure beamforming design in an energy-constrained amplify-andforward (AF) relay network where the PS and TS strategies were both considered. Reference [16] focused on the secure beamforming in a wireless-powered non-regenerative multiple relay network, where the destination-based artificial noise (AN) was used as a new energy source to power multiple relays. Considering the cooperative cognitive network, joint design of the secure beamforming and the PS strategy was studied in [17] . Meanwhile, the authors in [18] introduced a novel two-phase protocol for a full duplex wirelesspowered relay with self-energy recycling and uninterrupted information transmission was achieved. However, the CSI in [15] - [18] was assumed to be perfectly known at the source/relay.
In practical communication systems, the CSI associated with destination/eavesdropper is difficult to perfectly obtain at the transmitter due to the lack of cooperation with hostile eavesdroppers, imperfect channel estimation, as well as quantization and feedback errors [19] - [23] . As a result, it is essential to investigate the robust secure transmission for SWIPT systems under imperfect CSI. The authors of [24] derived the analytical closed-form expressions of secrecy outage capacity for wireless-powered massive multiple-input multiple-output (M-MIMO) relaying systems, in which the AF and decode-and-forward (DF) protocols were respectively adopted. Reference [25] studied the robust secure beamforming for SWIPT in a cognitive relay network, where the primary receiver and the secondary receiver simultaneously received information and harvested energy using the PS strategy. Nevertheless, the authors of [25] did not take into account the wireless-powered relay. To the best of our knowledge, AN-aided robust secure transmission schemes in wireless-powered non-regenerative relay networks have not been reported in the open literature.
In this paper, we focus on the robust secure beamforming design in a wireless-powered non-regenerative relay network, in which a four-node system consisting of one source node (S), one relay node (R), one destination node (D), and one eavesdropper (E) is considered. Unlike [15] , perfect CSI associated with D/E is unavailable at S/R in our design. Different from the scenario in [25] , R is energy-constrained which is powered by RF signals from S. To support secure transmission from R to D, the AN is injected at R to deteriorate the reception of E. Our objective is to minimize the transmit power at R subject to the secrecy rate constraint and the transmit power constraint at R. The main contributions are summarized as follows: 1) In this paper, we investigate robust beamforming design for a general case where E intercepts the signals from both S and R. The wireless channels from S to E and from R to D/E are imperfectly known at S/R, which are subject to certain CSI errors. In particular, two types of energy harvesting strategies are taken into account termed PS strategy and TS strategy, respectively.
2) In the case of the PS strategy, the process of coordinating ID and EH consists of two phases. Applying the S-procedure and semidefinite relaxation (SDR) techniques, a three-layer algorithm is proposed to solve the worst-case power minimization problem. Furthermore, the computational complexity of this algorithm is analyzed.
3) In the case of the TS strategy, the process of realizing ID and EH follows three phases. Based on the S-procedure and SDR techniques, a three-layer algorithm is proposed to solve the worst-case power minimization problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model of the wireless-powered relay networks employing physical layer security. In Section III, we investigate robust beamforming design with PS strategy. In Section IV, we investigate robust beamforming design with TS strategy. Finally, in Section V we present simulation results to validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes, followed by our conclusions in Section VI.
Notations: Boldface lowercase and uppercase letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. The transpose, conjugate, conjugate transpose, rank and trace of the matrix A are denoted as A T , A * , A H , rank(A) and tr(A), respectively. I n represents an n × n identity matrix. A 0 means A is a positive semidefinite matrix. ⊗ and denote the Kronecker and Hadamard products, respectively. vec(·) returns a vector by stacking the columns of a matrix, E[·] represents the expectation operation, and · denotes the Euclidean norm. The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and covariance matrix is denoted by CN (0, ).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless-powered non-regenerative relay network, where S sends confidential information to D via a trusted R in the presence of an E, as shown in Fig. 1 . All nodes have a single antenna except that R has N T > 1 antennas. We assume that E is another communication node in the same relay network. In practice, D is far away from S due to a long propagation distance as in [13] and [15] , thus we assume that there is no direct link between S and D. In general, E would like to be close to S and R for better eavesdropping. Following [24] and [26] , we assume that E can intercept the FIGURE 1. System model of a wireless-powered relay network.
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signal transmission from both S and R, and E would not interfere with the training signal sent from D to S for the channel estimation.
The R 1 is assumed to be energy-constrained and there is no other energy sources (such as solar pannel, wind turbine) available at R, thus it is very difficult to maintain an active state always. To this end, we assume that R not only processes the received signal, but also harvests and stores the energy from the RF signals transmitted by S for forwarding the received signals to D. The whole system operates in a halfduplex mode and accordingly the information transmission from S to D with the aid of R requires two phases to complete. Specifically, in the first phase, S transmits signals to R and then R forwards the received signals to D in the second phase.
Let the channel vectors over links S→R, S→E, R→D and R→E be denoted by
and h re ∈ C N T ×1 , respectively. We assume that all channel coefficients are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variables obeying CN (0, 1). Generally, R can obtain perfect CSI associated with h r using channel estimation. However, perfect CSI associated with h d and h e is difficult to obtain at S/R due to the feedback delay and estimation errors in practical systems. Here, the CSI uncertainties are modeled by worst-case model as in [14] and [25] . We assume that channel uncertainties are bounded, and accordingly denote the regions of the actual channels h se , h re and h d as H se , H re and H d , which can be given by
respectively, whereĥ se ,ĥ re andĥ d are the estimated channel vectors, which are available to S/R. h se , h re and h d denote the corresponding channel-error vectors. And se , re and d denote the non-negative error bounds, respectively. In the subsequent sections, the detailed analysis about robust secure beamforming design using the PS and the TS strategies are respectively developed.
III. ROBUST SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN USING PS STRATEGY
In this section, the PS strategy [8] is used at R to coordinate the ID and EH processes, which consists of two phases. Specifically, in the first phase of duration T /2 (T is the total block duration), S sends confidential signals to R, and then R splits the received signal into two separate streams, one for ID and the other for EH. In the second phase of the remaining duration T /2, R multiplies the received signal with a beamforming matrix and forwards it to D.
In the first phase, S transmits confidential information s with power P s to R, while E intercepts the signal from S. 1 Note that R is assumed to be an energy constrained node with initial power P 0 and having a rechargeable battery with infinite capacity [27] .
Thus, the received signal at R and E is written as [15] , [25] 
where n r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 r I N T ) and n 1,e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e ) denote the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at R and E, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume E[|s| 2 ] = 1. The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at E is given by SNR PS 1,e = P s |h se | 2 σ 2 e . Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the PS ratio of R, thus the signal fraction for ID at R is written as
where n r,ID ∼ CN (0, δ 2 r I N T ) is the AWGN caused by signal processing at R.
On the other hand, the amount of energy harvested at R is expressed as
where η ∈ (0, 1] denotes the energy conversion efficiency from signal power to circuit power. The harvested energy is preserved to extend the lifetime of R. For convenience, we assume η = 1 throughout this paper. Correspondingly, the maximum available power at R is given by
where P 0 denotes the initial power at R. To enhance secure communication by preventing E from eavesdropping the confidential information transmitted by S to D, in the second phase the AN-aided secure communication scheme is considered at R. Specifically, R performs transmit beamforming for delivering the confidential information to D and at the same time generates Gaussian AN using the energy stored in the battery to prevent the information leakage to E. Let F ∈ C N T ×N T denote the beamforming matrix carrying the confidential information. Then the transmit signal at R can be represented as
where z ∈ C N T ×1 ∼ CN (0, ) denotes the complex Gaussian AN generated by R. 0 represents the transmit covariance matrix of z.
The received signals at D and E in the second phase can be respectively expressed as 
where n d ∼ CN (0, δ 2 d ) and n 2,e ∼ CN (0, δ 2 e ) denote the AWGN at D and E, respectively. Then, the required transmit VOLUME 4, 2016 power for forwarding the source signal at R is given by (10) According to the received signal in (8) and (9), the instantaneous SINRs at both D and E in the second phase can be expressed as 
Using maximum-ratio combining (MRC) at E, the achievable instantaneous secrecy rate is formulated as
where the notation [x] + = max{x, 0} is used, since the secrecy rate is defined as a nonnegative quantity. The factor 1 2 is recognized by noting the fact that the overall transmission is divided into two time slots.
We focus on the joint design of the beamforming matrix F, AN covariance matrix , and the power splitting ratio ρ to minimize the transmission power at the R and guarantee secure communication between S and D, subject to the secrecy rate constraint and the transmit power constraint at R. Hence, the robust optimization problem is formulated as
where R 0 is the prescribed target secrecy rate. Note that the constraint in (14c) represents the transmit power of R that should be below the maximum available power at R. It can be observed that Problem (14) is challenging to solve directly, since the secrecy rate constraint in (14b) and transmit power constraint in (14c) are non-convex. Therefore, the key idea to solve Problem (14) is that transforming the constraints in (14b) and (14c) into tractable forms.
To effectively solve Problem (14), we define f = vec(F) and Q 1 = (ρP s h * r h T r + ρσ 2 r I N T + δ 2 r I N T ) ⊗ I N T . Following the matrix properties of
and defining
where 1 ∈ R N T ×1 denotes an all-one column vector of dimension N T and E ∈ R N 2 T ×N 2 T denotes diag (1, 1, . . . , 1) . By introducing a real-valued slack variable β 1 and applying matrix properties of (15) 
where
It is worth mentioning that β 1 can be physically interpreted as the SINR requirement at the D [11] . Furthermore, it is straightforward to show the optimal solution of Problem (20) is identical as Problem (14) due to β 1 and c 1 exists.
Since c 1 is dominated by β 1 , we only need to focus on the optimal value β 1 in the sequence. By fixing β 1 =β 1 ∈ S 0 (S 0 is an interval) and with equation (1) 
It can be observed that Problem (22) is non-convex due to semi-infinite constraints (22b) and (22c) and the rankone constraint (22f). To make the problem more tractable, we employ S-procedure [14] to convert the constraints (22b) and (22c) into linear matrix inequalities (LMIs).
Lemma 1 (S-Procedure): Let
, and c k ∈ R. Then, the implication f 1 (q) ≤ 0 ⇒ f 2 (q) ≤ 0 holds if and only if there exists a µ ≥ 0 such that
provided that there exists a pointq such that f 1 (q) < 0. For constraint (22b), we rewrite it as follows
By using S-Procedure and introducing the real-valued slack variable λ 1 , we convert constraint (22b) into an LMI given by
Similarly, the constraint (22c) is also expressed as
where λ 2 ≥ 0 is the introduced slack variable. Using the SDR technique [21] , [28] to drop the rank-one constraint (22f), and replacing (22b) and (22c) by (26) and (27) 
Note that Problem (28) is still challenging to solve with respect to the coupled optimization variable ρ. In fact, Problem (28) can be classified into a two-layer optimization problem, where the outer layer is a single-variable optimization problem about ρ while the inner layer is a convex SDP problem with fixed ρ. To this end, Problem (28) is convex under a fixed ρ and thus it can be solved efficiently by existing software tools, e.g., CVX [29] .
To summarize, we finally solve the original Problem (20) by a three-layer iterative algorithm. In layer 1, the optimal β 1 value is searched from the interval S 0 using uniform sampling method; In layer 2, the optimal ρ value is searched from the interval (0, 1) using uniform sampling method; In layer 3, the optimal values of (W, ) can be obtained using the CVX software. If the optimal solution W * of Problem (28) satisfies rank(W * ) = 1, then the optimal beamforming vector f can be obtained by utilizing the eigenvalue decomposition [14] , [30] . Alternatively, the Gaussian randomization or principle eigenvector approaches [14] , [30] can be applied to generate the approximate solution. In general, the eigenvalue decomposition method performs worse than the Gaussian randomization method, provided that the number of randomizations is sufficiently large.
Complexity analysis: The main computational complexity for solving original Problem (20) is dominated by one-dimensional linear search for β 1 , one-dimensional linear search for ρ, and convex positive semidefinite constraints. Therefore, the computational complexity in this case is O{L 1 L 2 [3(N T + 1) 3.5 + 9(N T + 1) 2.5 + 27(N T + 1) 0.5 ]} log 2 (1/ ), where L 1 and L 2 are the number of one-dimensional linear search for β 1 and ρ, respectively. denotes the accuracy requirement.
IV. ROBUST SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN USING TS STRATEGY
In this section, the TS strategy [8] is used at R, which enables R utilize different time blocks to realize ID and EH processes. The information transmission process by using TS strategy follows three phases. Specifically, in the first phase, S transmits RF signals to power R for α fraction of the block time T , where 0 < α < 1. During the remaining block time (1 − α)T , the signal information is transmitted from S to R over (1 − α)T /2 duration, and then R uses the harvested energy to forward the source signals over (1 − α)T /2 duration. In the first phase, the received signal at R is similar to that of the PS strategy which is written as y TS r = P s h r s + n r + n r,ID ,
and E intercepts the signal from S as
where the notations in this section have the same meanings as they have in the previous section unless necessary. As such, the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at E is given by SNR TS 1,e = P s |h se | 2 σ 2 e . In the second phase, the amount of energy harvested at R is expressed as
Correspondingly, the maximum available power at R is given by
where P 0 is the initial power at R. Since a beamforming matrix F is employed at R in the third phase to forward the source signals to D, while keeping the signal private from E, the received signals at D and E can be VOLUME 4, 2016 respectively expressed as 
On the other hand, the required transmit power for forwarding the source signal at R is given by (35) where P 0 denotes the initial power at R.
As a result, the instantaneous SINRs at both D and E are given by
Using MRC at the E, the achievable instantaneous secrecy rate is formulated as [31] 
Under such a scenario, we aim at minimizing the transmission power P r at the R by jointly designing the beamforming matrix F and the TS ratio α, subject to the secrecy rate constraint and the transmit power constraint at R. Similar to the previous discussion, we define
By introducing a real-valued slack variable β 2 , the robust optimization problem is equivalently written as
s.t. max
Similarly, since c 2 is dominated by β 2 , we only need to focus on the optimal value β 2 in the sequence. By fixing β 2 =β 2 ∈ S 0 and with equation (1) 
It can be observed that Problem (22) is non-convex due to semi-infinite constraints (41b) and (41c) and the rank-one constraint (41f). As such, by introducing real-valued slack variables λ 3 , λ 4 and dropping the rank-one constraint 
Note that Problem (42) is still challenging to solve with respect to the coupled optimization variable α. Similarly, Problem (42) can also be classified into a two-layer optimization problem. To this end, Problem (42) is convex under a fixed α and thus it can be solved efficiently by existing software tools, e.g., CVX [29] .
To summarize, we finally solve the original Problem (39) by a three-layer iterative algorithm. In layer 1, the optimal β 2 value is searched from the interval S 0 using uniform sampling method; In layer 2, the optimal α value is searched from the interval (0, 1) using uniform sampling method; In layer 3, the optimal values of (W, ) can be obtained using the CVX software. If the optimal solution W * of Problem (42) satisfies rank(W * ) = 1, then the optimal beamforming vector f can be obtained by utilizing the eigenvalue decomposition [30] , [14] . Alternatively, the Gaussian randomization or principle eigenvector approaches [14] , [30] can be applied to generate the approximate solution. In general, the eigenvalue decomposition method performs worse than the Gaussian randomization method, provided that the number of randomizations is sufficiently large. In this case of TS strategy, the computational complexity for solving the three-layer optimization problem is similar to section III, thus is omitted herein.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to show the performance of the proposed robust secure beamforming schemes in the context of a wireless-powered nonregenerative relay network. For simplicity, we assume that the noise powers are set to σ 2 d = σ 2 e = δ 2 d = δ 2 e = 1dBW, channel-error bounds are the same as 2 d = 2 e = 2 , initial power is set to P 0 = 5dBW and the interval S 0 = (0, 100). All simulation results are averaged over 1000 randomly generated channel realizations. In Fig. 2 , we present the performance comparison of our proposed robust secure beamforming schemes (denoted as ''Robust optimal, PS'' and ''Robust optimal, TS''), the robust beamforming schemes with the fixed PS and TS ratios (denoted as ''Robust suboptimal, PS'' and ''Robust suboptimal, TS'') and the perfect CSI based scheme, respectively. The perfect CSI scheme is obtained when h d = 0 and h e = 0 [15] . Intuitively, the required transmission power at R increases as the secrecy rate threshold R 0 increases. It is observed that the performance gap between our proposed schemes and the robust suboptimal schemes is narrow when the secrecy rate threshold R 0 is less than 2bit/s/Hz, and it becomes larger as the increase of the secrecy rate threshold. Not surprisingly, the required transmission power at R for perfect CSI is lower than those in imperfect CSI cases. Furthermore, it is observed that the proposed PS strategy is superior to the TS strategy for minimizing the transmission power in high secrecy rate threshold regime. Then, we study the impact of channel-error variances on transmission power of R with P s = 30dBW and secrecy rate R 0 = 1bit/s/Hz. Fig. 3 shows the comparison of the required transmission power at R for our proposed schemes and the schemes without AN (denoted as ''Robust optimal w/o AN, PS'' and ''Robust optimal w/o AN, TS''). Here, the two schemes without AN are obtained by solving Problem (28) and Problem (42) with = 0, respectively. From Fig. 3 , it is observed that, as the channel-error variance 2 increases, higher total transmit power at R is required, which confirms the importance of CSI accuracy in performance optimization schemes. More interestingly, we can clearly see that the required transmission power of our proposed schemes is the same as the schemes without AN. This implies that our proposed schemes do not expend extra power to support SWIPT communication security. For more comprehensive investigating the performance of the proposed schemes, Fig. 4 illustrates the relationship between the required transmission power P r at R versus the transmit power P s at S for R 0 = {0.5, 1}. For each PS VOLUME 4, 2016 scheme and TS scheme, when the transmit power at S P s is high, the required transmission power at R exhibits saturation behavior. This is because the transmission power at R should be below the transmit power at S according to the constraints in (20d) and (39d). We can also verify that the performance gap of the proposed schemes with PS and TS strategies is very large, which suggests that the PS scheme is more suitable for guaranteeing communication security.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an AN-aided robust beamformer has been designed for a secure wireless-powered non-regenerative relay network, where R is energy-constrained and powered by RF signals from S. Only imperfect CSI associated with D/E was assumed at S/R in our design, and both the PS and TS strategies were employed to coordinate the ID and EH processes. The formulated non-convex transmit power minimization problems were relaxed and reformulated into SDP forms with LMI constraints by using both the S-procedure and SDR techniques, thus being solved globally optimally. Numerical results showed the effectiveness of the proposed robust beamforming schemes. Furthermore, the PS strategy performed better than the TS strategy in our proposed robust beamforming design. 
